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THE COLORADO CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT:
PANACEA OR PANDORA'S Box?
I. INTRODUCTION
One easily forgets the rampant marketplace abuses that existed in
this country less than ninety years ago. Unscrupulous sellers of proprie-
tary medicines and nostrums preyed on desperate consumers, checked
only by limits of their creativity and greed. In the early Twentieth Cen-
tury, a consumer could select from a variety of cures for cancer, tumors,
asthma, diphtheria, gallstones and epilepsy. 1 During the heyday of
quackery, there existed little, if any, regulation of the market, and con-
sumers relied primarily on dependable publications to warn them of po-
tentially fraudulent claims.
2
Both Texas and Colorado enacted deceptive trade legislation within
three years of each other.3 Both Acts provide treble damages and attor-
1. In 1912, the American Medical Association published a book entitled NOSTRUMS
AND QUACKERY, intended to warn unsuspecting consumers of the fraud perpetrated by
nostrum vendors and proprietors of patent medicines. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
NosTRuMs AND QUACKERY (2d ed. 1912). The book described over a dozen fraudulent
"cancer and tumor cures" available to consumers of the time. The most notable of these
cures was Dr. Bye's Combination Oil Cure, touted as "[a]n infallible cure for all forms of
cancer... [and] an absolute antidote for all cancerous afflictions." Id. at 34. C.W. Mixer,
another cunning entrepreneur of the time, claimed his cancer cure gave "safe, speedy and
certain relief to the most horrible forms of cancer of the breast, face, stomach and womb."
Id. at 57. The Radio-Sulpho Company of Denver, Colorado marketed its own product,
which, when used in conjunction with a plaster made of Limburger cheese, was supposed
to cure cancer. "The cost of this evil-smelling treatment [was] $25.00 a month 'and up-
ward'." Id. at 62-63.
Dr. D.H. Dye made even more outlandish claims. He claimed that "[n]o women need
any longer dread the pains of childbirth, or remain childless," and that he "has proved
that all pain at childbirth may be entirely banished .... Id. at 237. Another enterprising
businessman was A.W. Van Bysterveld, a self-proclaimed expert urine inspector. "A.W.
Van Bysterveld, the chief inspector, whose secret methods are not taught in schools, exam-
ines on an average of 25,000 bottles of urine a year. This alone stamps him as an authority
and of exceptional qualifications." Id. at 290-91. In Cincinnati, Otto Kalmus headed the
"Epileptic Institute," which distributed "The Schbnka Treatment." The advertisements
for this treatment professed that "[n]o epileptic, no matter how severe his trouble, should
hesitate in taking the Sch~nka Treatment, for if his case is curable this treatment is the one
he can depend on." Id. at 350-351.
2. See id
3. The Texas legislature enacted the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (TDTPA) in
1973. The current enactment is found in TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (West
1987 & Supp. 1992). The Texas legislature has amended the DTPA in every regularly
scheduled legislative session since its original enactment. See DTPA, 63d Leg., R.S., ch.
143, 1973 TEx. GEN. LAws 322; DTPA, ch. 62, 1975 TEx. GEN. LAws 149; DTPA, chs. 216
& 336, 1977 TEx. GEN. LAws 600, 892; DTPA, ch. 603, 1979 TEx. GEN. LAws 1327; DTPA,
ch. 307, 1981 Tx. GEN. LAws 863; DTPA, ch. 883, 1983 TEx. GEN. LAws 4943; DTPA, ch.
564, 1985 TEx. GEN. LAws 2165; DTPA, ch. 280, 1987 TEx. GEN. LAws 1641; DTPA, ch.
380, 1989 TEx. GEN. LAws 1490. Unless otherwise indicated, the Act referred to will be
the 1989 amended version.
On the other hand, the Colorado legislature enacted its Consumer Protection Act in
1969, and has made only minor changes since. The current enactment is found in COLO.
REv. STAT. § 6-1-101 (1973 & Supp. 1990). The only changes were made by 1975 COLO.
SEss. LAws 259, § 1; 1984 CoLo. SESS. LAws 289, 290, §§ 2, 2; 1985 COLO. SESS. LAws
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ney fees for a successful plaintiff. Drastic disparities, however, exist in
the number of deceptive trade cases litigated in each state, the number
ofjournal articles published on the topic in each state and the legal com-
munity's general familiarity with the Acts in each state.4 In essence, the
Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (TDTPA) that originally served as
a shield against unscrupulous sellers 5 has now become a sword,6 while
disuse has relegated the Colorado Act to virtual obscurity. Part I of this
Article provides a general overview of deceptive trade legislation while
Part II compares the historical development and current treatment of
deceptive trade statutes in both Colorado and Texas. Part III discusses
the reasons for the Colorado Act's relative obscurity and speculates as to
whether increased use would be a panacea or Pandora's box.
II. BACKGROUND
Although quackery did not die easily, crackdowns by the United
States Postal Service and the Food and Drug Administration in the early
Twentieth Century eventually led to its demise.7 During this same time
period, Printer's Ink, a trade publication, proposed a model statute to
deal with misleading, deceptive and unfair practices.8 This proposed
307, § 2; 1987 COLO. SEss. LAws 357, §§ 3, 4; 1989 COLO. SESS. LAws 360, 363, 357, §§ 1,
2, 4; and 1990 COLO. SEss. LAws 380, 378, §§ 2, 2; 1991 COLO. SESS. LAWs 329, 331 §§ 1.
4. One commentator observed the importance of familiarity with UDAP legislation:
If we fail to tell our students that this legislation exists, they may overlook it when
they enter practice. The risk of overlooking such statutes appears even greater
when we recognize that the relatively low amounts at issue seldom justify exhaus-
tive research. If we fail to consider these statutes when we write about contracts
problems, our discussion may be incomplete and misleading.
Stewart Macaulay, Bambi Meets Godzilla: Reflections of Contracts Scholarship and Teaching vs. State
Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Statutes, 26 Hous. L. REV. 575, 589
(1989).
The staggering number of cases generated by the TDTPA and the shear number of
periodical and law journal articles on the topic suggest that most practicing attorneys in
that state are aware of the statute. Indeed, the more cases and articles discussing the topic,
the more familiar the respective legal community becomes with the state's consumer pro-
tection statute. In Colorado, however, over the past twenty years, there have only been
approximately 20 reported cases involving the Colorado DTPA-half of which were
brought by the Attorney General's office. There are no law review articles specifically dis-
cussing the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA), but a few articles contain vague
and tangential references to the Act. The lack of primary and secondary material suggests
that Colorado attorneys are unaware of the Act and the benefits it can offer wronged con-
sumers and their attorneys.
5. Woods v. Littleton, 554 S.W.2d 662, 669 (Tex. 1977)(Texas legislature intended
DTPA to deter unscrupulous sellers who engage in deceptive trade).
6. See generally John R. Harrison, Jr., The Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act: The Shield Becomes A Sword, 17 ST. MARY's LJ. 879 (1986).
7. Id.
8. The proposed statute read:
Any person, firm, corporation or association who, with intent to sell or in any wise
dispose of merchandise, securities, services, or anything offered by such person,
firm, corporation or association, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale or
distribution, or with intent to increase the consumption thereof, or to induce the
public in any manner to enter into any obligation relating thereto, or to acquire
title thereto, or an interest therein, makes, publishes, disseminates, circulates, or
places before the public, or causes, directly or indirectly, to be made, published,
disseminated, circulated, or placed before the public, in this State, in a newspaper
or otherpublication, or in the form of a book, notice, handbill, poster, bill, circu-
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statute was the first dealing with deceptive practices prior to the forma-
tion of the Federal Trade Commission in 1914. Quackery, however, was
only one form of deceptive or fraudulent trade practice. Although that
particular form faded into history, many other forms still exist today.
In the past thirty years, all states have enacted some sort of legisla-
tion intended to curb fraudulent, deceptive and unfair trade practices. 9
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) initially prompted states to enact
UDAP statutes1 ° and most states eventually adopted one of the forms
suggested by the FTC.1 1 The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
also encouraged states to enact similar consumer protection legisla-
tion. 12 Most of the state UDAP statutes are patterned after the language
lar, pamphlet, or letter, or in any other way, an advertisement of any other re-
garding merchandise, securities, .service, or anything so offered to the public,
which advertisement contains any assertion, representation or statement of fact
which is untrue, deceptive or misleading, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
EARL W. KINTNER, A PRIMER ON THE LAW OF DECEPTIVE PRACTICES: A GUIDE FOR THE
BUSINESSMAN 480 (1971). While this proposed legislation was far from a model of clarity,
containing a single sentence with over 160 words, forty states eventually adopted it. Id. at
14.
9. See generally Appendix I.
10. Marshall A. Leaffer and Michael H. Lipson, Consumer Actions Against Unfair or Decep-
tive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses Of Federal Trade Commission Jurisprudence, 48 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 521, 522 (1980); William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, 46 TUL.
L. REV. 724, 729 n.10, 730 n.14 (1972) [hereinafter Lovett I]. The acronyms UDAP (Un-
fair or Deceptive Acts and Practices) and DTPA (Deceptive Trade Practices Acts) are used
somewhat imprecisely in this Article and Appendix I to describe various state enactments
proscribing unfair, unconscionable, deceptive or fraudulent trade practices. This impreci-
sion is necessary because there is no uniform term used to describe these statutes.
11. In 1967, 1969 and 1970, the Council of State Governments published recommen-
dations for model deceptive trade practices legislation. The 1967 version was extremely
broad and merely suggested state legislation that would award attorney fees and damages
against a person found to have knowingly committed deceptive trade practices. THE COUN-
CIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION D-30 (1967). The 1969 ver-
sion went further to suggest a modified version of the 1967 proposal that provided for
"comprehensive protection to the public against all the various trade practices which un-
fairly injure competitors or deceive consumers." THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION C-4 (1969). Moreover, the suggested 1969 legislation en-
couraged states to pass statutes that gave "due consideration and great weight" to the
interpretations of the Federal Trade Commission and federal court decisions relating to
similar provisions in the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)(1988). THE
COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION C-5 (1969).
In 1970, for the first time, the Federal Trade Commission set forth three alternative
forms of legislation concerning deceptive trade practices for states to consider. The first
form contained the same broad language as § 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, which "prohibits unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts and prac-
tices" in trade or commerce. THE COUNCIL OR STATE GOVERNMENTS, SUGGESTED LEGISLA-
TION 142 (1970). The second suggested form, a bit less obtuse than the first, still
recommended outlawing all forms of deceptive, fraudulent and unfair acts or practices in
trade or commerce. Id. The third form specifically set forth the proscribed practices and
contained a "catch all" clause intended to reach most other forms of deceptive or unfair
trade practices. Id.
12. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws suggested two leading forms: The
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 7A U.L.A. 35 (1978) and the Uniform Consumer
Sales Practices Act, 7A U.L.A. 1 (1978). Several commentators have noted that the Uni-
form Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA) has limited usefulness because it only allows
private consumers to seek injunctive relief. Eight jurisdictions, including Colorado, Geor-
gia, Hawaii, Minnesota, Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio and Oregon borrowed language
from the UDTPA. However, most of these jurisdictions, altered their enactments to pro-
vide for private remedies. See Richard F. Dole, Jr., Consumer Class Actions Under the Uniform
1992]
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found in Section 5 (a) (1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 13 which
provides a remedy to the federal government for deceptive trade prac-
tices but not to private individuals. 14 The FTC believed state legislation
allowing private remedies could give consumers more bargaining
power, and diffuse the wide economic losses caused by fraud in the
marketplace. 15
The FTC recognized that while traditional commercial law provided
acceptable remedies for sophisticated businesspersons, consumers often
suffered because of vexatious litigation costs and insurmountable bur-
dens of proof. In most consumer controversies, the risk involved and
the expense of litigation outweigh the likelihood of recovery under
traditional common law theories of recovery. "[U]nder the traditional
rules of the game, it was less expensive to suffer most deceptive trade
practices than to remedy them through legal action." 16 But most state
enactments, including those in Texas and Colorado, authorize private
actions to encourage private litigation and to deter unscrupulous
merchants by providing for attorney fees, double or treble damages and
punitive damages. 17 The generous damage and attorney fees provisions
available under most UDAP enactments give consumers the ability and
incentive to pursue redress without the fear of owing extraordinary
court costs and attorney fees, despite success on the merits of the case.
Many courts have observed that state UDAP enactments make individual
consumers "private attorney generals."'
18
A. Distinctions Between UDAP Acts and the Common Law
Noting the differences between UDAP statutes and common law
tort actions reveals why private UDAP actions are so attractive. Under
state UDAP statutes, the "deception" standard is broader and more dy-
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 1968 DUKE LJ. 1101, 1110-13. The Uniform Consumer Sales
Practices Act contains more liberal provisions for individual redress and gives consumers
incentive to bring claims against those engaged in fraudulent or deceptive trade practices.
13. 15 U.S.C. § 41-77 (1976).
14. It is well settled that private consumers have no remedy under the FTC Act. Ac-
cording to the court in Carlson v. Coca-Cola Company, 483 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1973),
section 5(a)(1) of the Act "provided [plaintiff] with no direct remedy, either explicitly or
implicitly. The protection against unfair trade practices afforded by the Act vests initial
remedial power solely in the Federal Trade Commission." Id. at 280.
In fact, private individuals never had recourse under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) when they
fell victim to deceptive practices. Amalgamated Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309
U.S. 261, 268 (1940)(dictum); Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926);
Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. St. Regis
Paper Co., 355 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir. 1966)(dictum); New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v.
Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 352 (3d Cir. 1964), aft'd, 381 U.S. 311
(1965).
15. William A. Lovett, Private Actions for Deceptive Trade Practices, 23 AD. L. REv. 271
(1971) [hereinafter Lovett II]; Lovett I, supra note 10, at 724-25.
16. Lovett I, supra note 10, at 725.
17. See generally Appendix I, cols. 3-5.
18. Economic Dev. Assoc. v. Cititrust, No. 052665, 1991 WL 50316, *3 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1991); Freeman v. Alamo Management Co., 586 A.2d 619, 624 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991),




namic than the standard required for common law fraud. 19 In fact, most
states prohibit "unfair" or "deceptive" practices, which include: (1) any
practice that offends public policy-whether under some common law,
statutory or other standard of unfairness; (2) any immoral, unethical,
oppressive or unscrupulous practice; or (3) any practice that causes sub-
stantial injury to consumers. 20 On the other hand, a prima facie case of
common law fraud usually requires: (1) a false representation; (2) reli-
ance on the representation by the plaintiff; (3) damage as a result of the
reliance; and (4) defendant's knowledge of the falsity.2 1 Most state
UDAP enactments do not require intent or knowledge unless they pro-
vide to the contrary.2 2 Most states statutes contain few provisions that
require scienter.2 3 Since the purpose of UDAP legislation is to protect
the consumer regardless of the seller's intent, requiring scienter under
all provisions of a UDAP statute would "effectively emasculate the act
and contradict its fundamental purpose." 24 Moreover, treble damages
can be awarded for any UDAP violation, regardless of intent. The Texas
Supreme Court specifically overruled a lower court holding implying an
intent requirement for an award of treble damages. 2 5
19. In Heller v. Silverbranch Constr. Corp., 382 N.E.2d 1065 (Mass. 1978), the court
held:
Silverbranch has ignored years of precedent pertinent and unfavorable to its
present appeal. Both this court and the Supreme Court have consistently held
that consumer protection statutes created new substantive rights by making con-
duct unlawful which was not previously unlawful under the common law or any
prior statute. The statutory language is not dependent on traditional tort or con-
tract law concepts for its definition.
Id. at 1069-70.
20. FTC v. Sperry and Hutchinson, Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §§ 525-50 (1977).
22. Bond Leather Co. v. Q.T. Shoe Mfg. Co., 764 F.2d 928 (lst Cir. 1985) (applying
Massachusetts law); United Roasters Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 649 F.2d 985 (4th Cir.
1981) (applying North Carolina law) cert. dened, 454 U.S. 1054 (1981); State v. O'Neill
Investigations, Inc., 609 P.2d 520 (Alaska 1980); Stephenson v. Capano, Dev. Inc., 462
A.2d 1069 (Del. 1983); Duhl v. Nash Realty Inc., 429 N.E.2d 1267 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981);
Thomas v. Sun Furniture and Appliance Co., 399 N.E.2d 567 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); Smith
v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1980); Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682 (Tex.
1980); Williams v. Trail Dust Steak House, Inc., 727 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987);
Chambless v. Barry Robinson Farm Supply, 667 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984); Hyder
& Ingram Chevrolet, Inc., v. Kutach, 612 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Bowers v.
Transamerican Title Ins. Co., 675 P.2d 193 (Wash. 1983).
23. For example, the Colorado Consumer Protection Act requires scienter for three
of its fifteen provisions:
(a) Knowingly passes off goods, services, or property as those of another;
(b) Knowingly makes a false representation as to the source, sponsorship, ap-
proval, or certification of goods, services, or property;
(c) Knowingly makes a false representation as to the characteristics, ingredients,
uses, benefits, alterations, or quantities of goods, food, services, or property or a
false representation as to the sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connec-
tion of a person therewith ....
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-105 (1) (1973 & Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
The Texas Deceptive Trade Practice Act only requires scienter under one provision:
(13) Knowingly making false or misleading statements of fact concerning the need
for parts, replacement, or repair service.
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17A6 (13) (West 1987) (emphasis added).
24. Thomas, 399 N.E.2d at 570.
25. Pennington, 606 S.W.2d at 682.
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A few courts require that the consumer rely on the deceptive act,2 6
however, these courts generally interpret this requirement narrowly.27
Courts may base liability on a de minimis finding that the seller intended
to do the act that caused the deception-not the deception itself. 28
Even where the courts require the consumer to demonstrate the seller's
intent to deceive, this requirement is generally liberally interpretated
such that a failure to supply goods conforming to the consumer's re-
quest creates a rebuttable presumption of intent to deceive.
29
B. Limited Common Law Defenses Available Under UDAP Statutes
Several UDAP enactments limit the defenses that might normally be
available for common law fraud. While only a few states have reported
case law on this issue, some state courts specifically concluded that the
primary purpose of UDAP legislation is to provide consumers a cause of
action without the additional burden imposed by traditional common
law defenses.3 0 Other states codify the available defenses to a UDAP
action. Although many common law defenses might not be available, a
plaintiff's action may still fail for various reasons. A claim may fail if:
(1) the litigant is not a "consumer" under the act; (2) the alleged
wrongdoing is not proscribed by the act; (3) notice, if required by the
act, is not sent; or (4) the litigant fails to plead a cause of action with
particularity, if required to do so by the state's courts.
In an action brought by a private individual, a defendant has an ab-
solute defense if the plaintiff is not a "consumer" under the statute.
While most state enactments give liberal interpretation to the word
"consumer," the facts of each case will dictate whether the plaintiff is a
protected party.3 1 Moreover, the deceptive act or omission that forms
the basis of the action must be proscribed by one of the provisions in the
state enactment. Obviously, if the act or omission in question is not for-
26. See Scott v. Western Int'l Surplus Sales, Inc., 517 P.2d 661 (Or. 1973); Luedeman
v. Tri-West Constr. Co., 592 P.2d 281, 282 (Or. Ct. App. 1979).
27. In re Brandywine Volkswagen, Ltd., 312 A.2d 632, 633-34 (Del. 1973).
28. State v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 626 P.2d 1115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (basing
liability on the fact that the seller intended to do the act-not that the seller intended to
deceive).
29. Id.; cf. Bidwell v. German Motors, 586 P.2d 1003 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (holding
that while defendant had disposed of the engine in plaintiff's car without authorization
and replaced it with a rebuilt engine, there was no showing of a knowing, intentional or
false representation.).
30. The Texas courts have held that "[iln general, however, common law defenses
cannot defeat a DTPA claim." Watkins v. Hammerman and Gainer, 814 S.W.2d 867, 870
(Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (citing Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 616 (Tex. 1980)). In
Smith, the Texas Supreme Court held that the primary purpose of the Texas Deceptive
Trade Practices Act was to provide consumers a cause of action without the numerous
defenses available in common law actions of fraud and breach of warranty.
31. Most enactments include corporations in the term "consumer." In some in-
stances, however, a corporation may be engaged in a strictly commercial transaction, and
will not be entitled to the protections afforded consumers. Heller v. Lexton-Ancira Real
Estate Fund, Ltd., 1972, 809 P.2d 1016 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990) rev'd on other grounds 826
P.2d 819 (Colo. 1992); Duran v. Clover Club Foods Co., 616 F. Supp. 790 (D. Colo. 1985).
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bidden, an absolute defense exists. The National Consumer Law Center
recommends that practitioners:
,specify itemized prohibitions in which the seller has engaged,
and also allege a violation of the 'catch-all' prohibition ....
Catch-all allegations are more likely to survive motions for dis-
missal or summary judgment, will allow a wider range of proof,
[will] allow consumers to raise new facts at the summary judg-
ment stage, and improve the chances that amendments to the
complaint relate back to the first filing for purposes of the stat-
ute of limitations.
3 2
Most statutes also require plaintiffs to give informal notice to defendants
prior to the initiation of actions alleging UDAP violations and, while this
requirement is generally construed very liberally, it is nonetheless a de-
fense if the plaintiff fails to comply.
3 3
Some defendants successfully argue that since the elements of a
UDAP violation are so similar to the elements for common law fraud,
the allegations must be pleaded with particularity as with fraud. In
Duran v. Clover Club Foods Co. ,34 defendants moved for dismissal of plain-
tiff's UDAP action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). Rule
9(b) requires that "[i]n all averments of fraud . . ., the circumstances
constituting fraud ... shall be stated with particularity."35 Defendant
asserted that because the Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA)
contains the same elements as fraud, the plaintiff's claims were subject
to the particularity requirement of Rule 9(b).3 6 The court held that
Rule 9(b) applied to actions under the CCPA by reasoning that because
Rule 9(b) applied to securities act violations, which are not "precisely
actions for fraud,"3 7 it should apply to the CCPA. Further, the court
held that Rule 9(b) should apply because the purpose of the act was to
protect against consumerfraud.3 8 The application of Rule 9(b) to UDAP
actions makes little analytical sense when the plaintiff seeks redress
under a provision that does not require scienter. Nonetheless, a plaintiff
must recognize that courts have not made this distinction,3 9 and a de-
fense might lie if the complaint contains only general averments of a
defendant's wrongdoing.
32. JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES, § 1.8.2 (1988).
33. Although the Colorado Consumer Protection Act contains no such requirement,
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act does. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.505
(West 1987). See also Oil Country Haulers, Inc. v. Griffin, 668 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984); Hollingsworth Roofing Co. v. Morrison, 668 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984);
Johnson v. Willis, 596 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Travenol Lab., Inc. v. Bandy
Lab., Inc., 608 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980).
34. 616 F. Supp. 790 (D. Colo. 1985).
35. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
36. Duran, 616 F. Supp. at 793.
37. Id.; see also Temple v. Haft, 73 F.R.D. 49, 52 (D. Del. 1976) (holding FED. R. Civ. P.
9(b) applicable to securities act violations).
38. Temple, 73 F.R.D. at 52.
39. Id.
1992]
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III. VARIATIONS IN UDAP LEGISLATION
A. The Colorado Consumer Protection Act
The CCPA40 was enacted in 1969 by the General Assembly's House
Bill 1030, § 13.41 The Act, in its original form, was codified by Colo-
rado Revised Statute § 55-5-13 (1969) and later by § 6-1-101 (1987). In
1969, when the General Assembly passed the original CCPA, the legisla-
tive history of the Act was not memorialized in any way. In fact, prior to
1973, the Colorado legislature kept no records of any legislative history.
Senator John Fuhr, who sponsored the Act, maintained only a copy of
the final draft of House Bill 1030 in his "member file." Therefore, the
purpose of the act and events leading up to its passage will most likely
remain speculative.
Although similar to the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,
4 2
the CCPA incorporates the broader and more expansive language found
in the FTC's suggested legislation.43 The CCPA specifically enumer-
ates eighteen prohibited acts, including several of broad "catch-all" pro-
visions. The legislature uses these catch-all provisions most often
because they do not require scienter and proscribe a wide range of con-
duct.44 The CCPA allows a successful plaintiff to recover treble dam-
ages and attorney fees,4 5 although the court may award attorney fees at
its discretion. 4 6 The CCPA also allows the seller to recover attorney
fees and costs if the court determines the action was initiated in bad
faith, or for the purpose of harassment. 4 7 The statute gives the state
attorney general's office authority to bring an action to enforce the pro-
visions of the CCPA, and allows equitable relief in the form of an injunc-
tion. 48 If the attorney general succeeds, the CCPA provides for
restitution to the injured consumer(s), civil penalties in the amount of
$2,000 for an initial violation and up to $10,000 for subsequent viola-
40. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-101 (1973 & Supp. 1990).
41. House Bill 1030 was codified in 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 143.
42. See generally Dole, supra note 12 (describing the limited usefulness of the Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act as originally suggested by the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws). "Colorado's Act differs, however, in important particulars from the proto-
type." People ex tel. MacFarlane v. Alpert Corp., 660 P.2d 1295, 1296 (Colo. Ct. App.
1982).
43. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
44. See Jonathan Sheldon, Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices, § 3.2.1 (2d ed. 1988).
By way of example, COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-105 (1973 & Supp. 1990) sets forth several
"catch-all" prohibitions. The statute provides:
(1) A person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his
business, vocation, or occupation, he:
(g) Represents that goods, food, services, or property are of a particular stan-
dard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if he
knows or should know that they are of another ....
45. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113 (1973 & Supp. 1990).
46. Witters v. Daniels Motors, Inc., 524 P.2d 632 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974). COLO. REV.
STAT. § 6-1-113 (2)(b) (1973 & Supp. 1991) indicates that "[i]n the case of any successful
action to enforce said liability, the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney
fees as determined by the court [will be granted]." Id. (emphasis added).
47. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-113 (3) (1973 & Supp. 1991).
48. Id. § 6-1-112 (1973 & Supp. 1991).
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tions. 49 As with private civil actions, the attorney general can recover
attorney fees and costs in the court's discretion. 50
Since the General Assembly enacted the CCPA in 1967, only a few
reported decisions have helped to delineate the extent and limits of its
reach. In fact, the state attorney general initiated over half of the re-
ported cases under the CCPA-a remarkable statistic in light of the
treble damages and attorney fees available to private consumers.5 1
In one of the first cases to discuss the scope of the CCPA, Western
Food Plan, Inc. v. District Court,5 2 the state attorney general sought to re-
cover restitution from a corporation engaged in deceptive trade prac-
tices, including false representation and false and misleading
advertising. 53 In response to defendant's argument that the statute
does not provide the attorney general the ability to seek restitution, the
Colorado Supreme Court held "[i]n our view the quoted language must
be read in light of the broad legislative purpose to provide prompt, eco-
nomical, and readily available remedies against consumer fraud."'54
Subsequent CCPA decisions repeated the language in Western Food Plan
concerning the legislative purpose of the Act.55 Frequent citations to
the Western Food Plan language indicates the courts' willingness to give
the CCPA a broad, liberal application.
Colorado courts interpreting the CCPA seem to take an expansive
approach by reading and considering the CCPA in its entirety and inter-
preting the meaning of any one section by considering the overall legis-
lative purpose. 56 In People ex rel. MacFarlane v. Alpert Corp.,5 7 the
Colorado Court of Appeals reiterated that "[t]he Consumer Protection
Act was enacted in order to control various deceptive trade practices in
dealing with the public.... [I]n enacting a broad protective statute such
as the Consumer Protection Act, the General Assembly need not rede-
fine operative terms adequately indicated by the language utilized." 58
The Alpert court went on to hold that the CCPA applied to false or mis-
leading statements in the advertisement and sale of real estate. 59
In City & County of Denver v. May Dept. Stores Co., 60 another action
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. A precursory search for law journal articles on the Act was fruitless, except for a
few vague and tangential references.
52. 598 P.2d 1038 (Colo. 1979).
53. Id. at 1039.
54. Id. at 1041.
55. See, e.g., People ix rel. MacFarlane v. Alpert Corp., 660 P.2d 1295, 1297 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1982); Duran v. Clover Club Foods Co., 616 F. Supp. 790, 793 (D. Colo. 1985).
56. Alpert, 660 P.2d at 1297 (citing Howe v. People, 496 P.2d 1040 (Colo. 1972) and
State Highway Comm'n. v. Haase, 537 P.2d 300 (Colo. 1975)). See also COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 2-4-201 (1)(b) (1980 & Supp. 1991) (describing the preferable means of statutory
interpretation).
57. 660 P.2d 1295 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982).
58. Id. at 1297.
59. Id.
60. No. 89CV9274, 1990 WL 322653 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 1990), rev'd and remanded with
instructions, 16 Brief Times Rptr. 1041 (June 18, 1992) (reversed on grounds that trial
court's injunction failed to adequately prohibit the defendant's deceptive practices).
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brought by the Colorado Attorney General's Office, the trial court ini-
tially, and the appeals court subsequently, recognized the importance of
FTC jurisprudence in CCPA interpretation for the first time. FTCjuris-
prudence involves litigation under the Federal Trade Commission Act
and, while some states expressly rely on FTC jurisprudence in determin-
ing which trade practices are deceptive or unfair,61 the CCPA makes no
mention of the FTC. The May court began its discussion by acknowl-
edging that there were no cases on point in Colorado addressing most
of the CCPA questions at issue in the case. The court then noted the
considerable FTC authority and experience in the area of consumer pro-
tection, and turned to prior FTC precedent for guidance. 6 2 The May
court's recognition of FTC precedent opens a bountiful source of UDAP
case law to the CCPA plaintiff. Although the CCPA does not expressly
mention the FTC or its rulings, the May court's determination is sensi-
ble because the FTC initially prompted states to enact UDAP
legislation.
63
FTC decisions are extremely helpful for their precedential value be-
cause of the volume of decisions showing how a practice works, how the
practice is deceptive or unfair, how consumers are injured or misled and
demonstrating how even truthful statements can be unfair or mislead-
ing. But, given the language in May, it is important to understand that
61. See generally ALA. CODE § 8-19-1 (1984 & Supp. 1991) (giving "great weight" to
FTC interpretation); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471 (1986 & Supp. 1991) (giving "great
weight" to FTC interpretations); Amiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1521 (1987 & Supp. 1991)
(FTC determinations used as a guide); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 501.201 (West 1988) (FTC inter-
pretations are given "due consideration and great weight"); IDAHO CODE § 48-601 (1977 &
Supp. 1992) (FTC interpretations given "due consideration and great weight"); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 121 1/2 para. 261 (Smith-Hurd 1960 & Supp. 1991) (consideration given); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1401 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992) (FTC determinations control over
state); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93A (West 1984 & Supp. 1992) (guided by FTC interpre-
tations); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 30-14-101 (1991) (FTC determinations given due considera-
tion and great weight); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:1 (1984 & Supp 1991) (guided by
FTC determinations); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12-1 (Michie 1978 & Supp. 1992) (guided by
FTC); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1345.01 (Anderson 1979 & Supp. 1991) (Due considera-
tion and great weight given to FTC interpretations and rulemaking); R.I. GEN. LAw § 6-
13.1-1 (1985 & Supp. 1991) (due consideration and great weight given to FTC decisions);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-5-10 (Law. Co-op (1976 & Supp. 1991) (guided by FTC interpreta-
tions); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-101 (1988 & Supp 1991) (interpreted and construed
consistent with FTC); TEX. Bus. AND COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 (West 1987) (guided by
FTC Act); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-11-1 (1986 & Supp. 1992) (make state regulation consis-
tent with FTC policies on consumer protection, make uniform with states that enact simi-
lar laws); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9 § 2451 (1984 & Supp. 1991) (guided by FTC construction);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.010 (1989) (guided by FTC interpretations); W. VA. CODE
§ 46A-6-101 (1992) (guided by federal court interpretation).
62. The Colorado District Court for the City and County of Denver held:
There are no Colorado cases which address most of the questions of law raised as
issues in this lawsuit. However, there is considerable federal law and experience
in the area, and federal authorities are highly persuasive under these circum-
stances. (citations omitted) Further support for looking to federal law is found in
the CPA itself. . . . Therefore, the federal statute, 15 U.S.C. § 55(a)(1) and 16
C.F.R. § 233.1 et seq. (FTC Guides) provide a legal framework to view the issues
raised in this case.
May, No. 89 CV 9274, 1990 WL 322653, *7 (Colo. Dist. Ct.), rev'd and remanded with instruc-
tions, 16 Brief Times Rptr. 1041 (June 18, 1992).
63. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
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FTC decisions are merely guiding, not binding, on the Colorado courts.
In this respect, a state court may still find a certain practice violative of
the CCPA despite a contrary ruling by the FTC.64 This fact might be
beneficial to the CCPA plaintiff because the courts are not required to
blindly follow FTC precedent, as are states whose UDAF legislation spe-
cifically requires adherence to FTC precedent.6 5 While a complete dis-
cussion of the existing FTC case law is beyond the scope of this Article,
the UDAP plaintiff should be aware that tremendous precedent, on all
aspects of deceptive and unfair practices, is available to analogize in
CCPA litigation.
Although the May case was reversed and remanded, the reason for
the reversal was that the trial court's injunction failed to adequately pro-
hibit the defendant's deceptive practices.6 6 In reaching this ruling, the
Colorado Court of Appeals looked extensively to FTC jurisprudence
and indirectly supported the proposition that Colorado courts will look
to FTC case law when no Colorado case law exists.
67
B. The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act
Since the Texas legislature passed the Deceptive Trade Practices
Act (TDTPA) in 1973,68 the Act has spawned consumer litigation in
mammoth proportions. While the TDTPA and the CCPA have similar
parentage and wording, Texas attorneys litigate the TDTPA so fre-
quently that its contours and limits are more clearly established than
those of the CCPA. As a sailor undoubtedly prefers to sail well-charted
waters, attorneys certainly prefer to litigate well-charted areas of the law.
The case law precedent on virtually all aspects of the TDTPA is partially
responsible for the Pandora's box of litigation and it is incontrovertible
that the Texas legal community is intimately familiar with the reach and
limitations of the TDTPA. The TDPTA's passage was well-documented
and chronicled. By passing the TDTPA, the Texas legislature provided
consumers with a remedy for deceptive and misleading trade practices
without forcing them to shoulder the burden of proof and the numerous
defenses available under common law tort theories.
69
The current TDTPA prohibits deceptive acts or practices, but goes
64. In fact, several courts have, in fact, held that a practice may violate state UDAP
legislation without violating FTC regulations. See, e.g., Ramson v. Layne, 668 F. Supp.
1162 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Perlman v. Time, Inc., 380 N.E.2d 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); State v.
American TV & Appliance, 410 N.W.2d 596 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) rev'd on other grounds, 430
N.W. 2d 709 (Wis. 1988).
65. See supra note 60.
66. May, 16 Brief Times Rptr. at 1043.
67. Id at 1041 (citing Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. v. F.T.C., 605 F.2d 964 (7th Cir.
1979); Grolier, Inc. v. F.T.C., 699 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Thompson Medical Co.,
104 F.T.C. 648 (1984); F.T.C. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); Amrep v. F.T.C., 768 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1985)).
68. Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 (West 1987; Supp. 1992).
69. Pope v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 703 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1983); Rotello v.
Ring Around Prod., Inc., 614 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); Smith v. Baldwin, 611
S.W.2d 611 (Tex. 1980). See also supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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further to enumerate twenty-three specifically proscribed practices. 70
The TDTPA also provides consumers with additional actions for breach
of warranty, 71 or any other unconscionable practice, 72 that takes unfair
advantage of the consumer. In addition to actual damages, the TDTPA
allows two times that portion of the actual damages that does not exceed
$1,000 and up to three times the actual damages if the finder of fact
determines that the defendant acted knowingly.7 3 The TDTPA allows a
prevailing consumer to recover court costs and reasonable attorney
fees, 74 and also allows the court to award the defendant costs and fees if
the action was brought in bad faith or for purposes of harassment. 75
The Act provides for the District Attorney to seek civil remedies and
equitable relief under the Act, and provides for civil damages up to
$10,000.76
The TDTPA was designed to give the individual consumer greater
leverage to overcome the merchant's unequal bargaining power in the
marketplace. 7 7 The objectives behind the passage of the TDTPA were
three-fold. First, the generous damage provisions available under the
TDTPA were established to remove the economic barriers posed by vex-
atious litigation costs, court costs and attorney fees.7 8 By providing
treble damages, attorney fees and court costs, the TDTPA encourages
consumers to litigate claims despite their relatively low-dollar amount.
Second, at common law, consumers who fell victim to deceptive or un-
fair trade practices were limited to recovery under traditional tort and
70. Spradling v. Williams, 553 S.W.2d 143 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) aft'd, 566 S.W.2d
561 (1977) (enumeration of specific acts is not an exclusive list. The listing encompasses
any type of business activity that deceives consumers.); Prairie Cattle Co. v. Fletcher, 610
S.W.2d 849 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (ifjury finds that act or practice falls under list of enu-
merated prohibitions, act or practice is a deceptive trade practice as a matter of law);
Cravens v. Skinner, 626 S.W.2d 173 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) ("laundry list" of deceptive
trade practices is not all-inclusive).
71. Troutman v. Traeco Bldg. Sys., Inc., 724 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1987); Tom Benson
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Alvarado, 636 S.W.2d 815 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982); Chrysler Corp. v.
Schuenemann, 618 S.W.2d 799 (rex. Civ. App. 1981); Sam Montgomery Oldsmobile Co.
v.Johnson, 624 S.W.2d 237 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
72. Tax. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (a)(3) (West 1987).
73. Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (b)(1) (West 1987 & Supp. 1992).
74. Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (d) (West 1987).
75. Il § 17.50 (c).
76. Tax. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.47(c) (1987 & Supp. 1992).
77. See David F. Bragg, Comment, Caveat Vendor: The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices and
Consumer Protection Act, 25 BAYLOR L. REV. 425, 425 (1973) (Act shifts balance of bargaining
power from seller to buyer); see also Michael A. Gist, Note, Commercial Law--The Texas Decep-
tive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act Protects Foreign Purchasers in International Transac-
tions, 18 Tax. INr'L LJ. 369, 370 (1983) (initial purpose of the TDTPA was to correct the
effects of unequal bargaining power in marketplace).
78. Timothy Patton, Case Law Under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protec-
tion Act, 33 BAYLOR L. Rav. 533, 533 (1981) (TDTPA passed to encourage litigation of
small claims, ease burdens of proof, and discourage deceptive trade practices); Michael
Curry, The 1979 Amendments to the Deceptive Trade Practice-Consumer Protection Act, 32 BAYLOR
L. REV. 51, 52-53 (1980) (setting forth factors leading to the passage of the TDTPA, in-
cluding removal of economic barriers to litigation); Vincent P. Dhooghe, Note, Trade Regu-
lation-Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act-A Purchaser for Resale is a Consumer
Protected by DTPA, 16 ST. MARY'S LJ. 473, 478 (1985) (discussing removal of economic
barrier to litigation under generous damage provisions of TDTPA).
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contract theories.79 A plaintiff seeking redress under traditional com-
mon law theories must overcome onerous burdens of proof and com-
plex defenses. 80 By restricting the defenses available under the
TDTPA,8 l and by removing the scienter requirement from almost all
provisions of the Act,82 the statutory scheme imposed strict liability for
false, misleading or deceptive trade practices.8 3 The third objective be-
hind the passage of the TDTPA was deterrence. Provisions allowing
treble damages, attorney fees and court costs deter unscrupulous sellers
from engaging in deceptive trade practices.
8 4
By enacting section 17.44,85 the Texas legislature intended the
courts to give liberal construction to the Act to promote its underlying
purpose. Similar to the Colorado Act, the purpose of the TDTPA was to
protect consumers and provide efficient and economical procedures for
consumers to seek redress for harm caused by deceptive, unfair, mis-
leading or unconscionable trade practices.8 6 The TDTPA expressly
mandates liberal construction. In fact, several courts that have inter-
preted section 17.44 held that the TDTPA requires the most liberal con-
struction and comprehensive application possible without doing
violence to its terms.8 7 Indeed, since its inception in 1973, the Texas
courts expanded the definitions of "consumer"8 8 and "goods and serv-
79. See City & County of Denver v. May Dept. Stores Co., No. 89CV9274, 1990 WL 322653
(Colo. Dist. Ct. 1990), rev'd and remanded with instructions, 16 Brief Times Rptr. 1041 (June
18, 1992); David F. Bragg, Now We're All Consumers! The 1975 Amendments to The Consumer
Protection Act, 28 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 7 (1976); Curry, supra note 78, at 52 n.6; KiNTNER, supra
note 8, at 5-8.
80. Patton, supra note 78, at 533 (common law actions involve various defenses and
complex burdens of proof).
81. See May, 16 Brief Times Rptr. at 1043.
82. Trx. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 17.46 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992) has only one of
twenty one provisions that require scienter.
83. See Curry, supra note 78, at 52 (remedy of fraud at common law replaced by statu-
tory strict liability); Dhooghe, supra note 78, at 477 (aggrieved consumer can bring statu-
tory strict liability cause of action).
84. Pennington v. Singleton, 606 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. 1980) (treble damages deter
future violations); Woo v. Great Southwest Acceptance Corp., 565 S.W.2d 290, 298-99
(Tex. Civ. App. 1978) (consumers are allowed treble damages to deter unlawful conduct
by merchants and sellers); McDaniel v. Dulworth, 550 S.W.2d 395, 396 (Tex. Civ. App.
1977) (legislative intent behind provision allowing treble damages was deterrence).
85. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17A4 (West 1987 & Supp. 1992).
86. Id. Section 17.44 provides:
"This subchapter shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underly-
ing purposes, which are to protect consumers against false, misleading, and de-
ceptive business practices, unconscionable actions, and breaches of warranty and
to provide efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection."
Id.
87. Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 541 (Tex. 1981) (holding
that the courts are obligated to give the TDTPA the most liberal application possible with-
out doing violence to its terms); Smith v. Baldwin, 611 S.W.2d 611, 615 (Tex. 1980) (re-
fusing to restrict interpretation of TDTPA absent legislative intent).
88. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sale, 689 S.W.2d 890, 892 (Tex. 1985) (holding third-party
beneficiaries "consumers" under the Act); Big H Auto Auctions, Inc. v. Saenz Motors, 665
S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex. 1984) (resale purchaser considered "consumer" under TDTPA);
Rotello v. Ring Around Prod., Inc., 614 S.W.2d 455 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981) (Farmers
purchasing soy beans held "consumers" under Act); Otto, Inc. v. Cotton Salvage and
Sales, Inc., 609 S.W.2d 590 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980) (corporation was a consumer under the
TDTPA after 1975 amendment to Act); Temple News Agency v. Want Ads of Waco, 573
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ices''89 under the Act. Additionally, the Texas courts liberally expanded
the measure of actual damages available under the Act.90 One commen-
tator suggested that a judicially expansive interpretation of the Act is
warranted to protect consumers against new forms of misrepresentation
and deception, and to avoid the need for annual revision of the Act.9 1
While the Texas courts' liberal interpretation of the TDTPA might in
fact serve to protect consumers against novel deceptive trade practices,
this practice certainly has not curbed the Texas legislature's zealous de-
sire to amend the Act annually.
9 2
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COLORADo AcT's OBSCURrIT
Two primary reasons exist for the CCPA's relative obscurity since
its enactment in 1969. First, the Colorado Act contains fewer "catch-
all" provisions in its "laundry list" of deceptive practices than the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act.93 Second, the Texas Act imposes strict
liability for violations of the TDTPA by not requiring scienter for the
broadest and most inclusive provisions of the Act.94 Although both Acts
stem from identical parentage 95 and include a similarly worded "laun-
dry list" by imposing a scienter requirement,96 the Colorado General
Assembly increased the burden of proof a CCPA plaintiff must shoulder
as well as the number of defenses available to the CCPA defendant. The
wording of the Colorado Act provides an absolute defense to a seller
who makes a negligent misrepresentation or who makes an honest mis-
take that results in a misrepresentation. Thus, the increased burden of
proof, together with the increased number of defenses available under
the Colorado Act, necessarily raise the cost and risk of litigation by forc-
ing the plaintiff to investigate the defendant's state of mind and prove
S.W.2d 269 (rex. Ct. App. 1978) (holding a partnership could be a "consumer" for pur-
poses of the Act).
89. See, e.g., Big H Auto Auction, 665 S.W.2d at 758 (holding that resold goods are
"goods" for purposes of the Act); Flenniken v. Longview Bank and Trust Co., 661 S.W.2d
705, 707-08 (rex. 1983) (expanding scope of banking services included within the term
"services" in the TDTPA); Lucas v. Nesbitt, 653 S.W.2d 883 (rex. Ct. App. 1983) (holding
that the services of an attorney are subject to the proscriptions in the TDTPA); United
Postage Corp. v. Kammeyer, 581 S.W.2d 716 Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (holding stamp vend-
ing machine to be "goods" under Texas DTPA).
90. Kish v. Van Note, 692 S.W.2d 463, 466 (rex. 1985) (consumer should receive
greatest amount of damages factually established); Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc.,
667 S.W.2d 115, 117 (rex. 1984) (actual damage for mental anguish is recoverable under
the TDTPA upon a finding of knowing violation); White v. Southwestern Tel. Co., 651
S.W.2d 260, 262 (rex. 1983) (lost profits recoverable under TDTPA).
91. Edward R. McCarthy, Jr., Comment, An Analysis of the 1979 Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act and Possible Ram!ications of Recent Amendments: Is the Act Still Consumer Oriented?, 11
ST. MARY'S L.J. 885, 899 (1980).
92. See supra note 3.
93. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
96. For example, the TDTPA proscribes "passing off goods or services as those of
another," TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(1) (West 1987 & Supp. 1991), whereas
the CCPA only penalizes a seller who "[k]nowingly passes off goods, services, or property as




that the defendant knowingly engaged in a deceptive trade practice.
The increased cost of litigation and heightened risk posed by the scien-
ter requirement outweigh the relatively minor damages usually involved
in typical consumer disputes and perhaps discourage consumers from
bringing actions under the Colorado Act.
Two provisions of the CCPA add an objective intent requirement.
The first penalizes a defendant who "[rjepresents that goods are origi-
nal or new if he knows or should know that they are deteriorated, altered,
reconditioned, reclaimed, used or second-hand."'9 7 The second provi-
sion uses an objective intent requirement to forbid a seller from repre-
senting "that goods, food, services, or property are of a particular
standard, quality, or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or
model, if he knows or should know that they are of another."9 8 Although
an objective standard does not pose the significant hurdles of a scienter
requirement, it still requires a plaintiff to establish that a reasonable per-
son in the seller's position should have been aware of the misrepresenta-
tion. Similar to a scienter requirement, the objective intent standard
also increases the risk of litigation, increases the cost of litigation and
discourages plaintiffs from bringing an action under the Colorado Act
because of the small amount of damages typically involved.
Whatever the reason for imposing the intent requirement, the re-
sult is that few consumers are ever "protected" by the CCPA. As an
Ohio court observed in Thomas v. Sun Furniture &Appliance Co. ,99 a scien-
ter requirement under all provisions of a UDAP statute "effectively
emasculate[s] the act and contradict[s] its fundamental purpose."' 0 0 In-
deed, one might justifiably query why the Colorado General Assembly
imposed a scienter requirement for almost every provision of the CCPA
in light of the purported objective to provide "prompt, economical, and
readily available remedies against consumer fraud. ' 101
The second reason the CCPA remains veiled in enigma is, perhaps,
a function of the first reason. In Texas, the volumes of reported case
law on the TDTPA together with an abundance of law journal materials,
provide practitioners with current trends, case holdings and updates on
legislative changes to the Act. Certainly, a practitioner feels more com-
fortable making a claim under a consumer protection act once case pre-
cedent and scholarly secondary materials explore and define the
wrinkles and contours of the act. Because it is used so infrequently,
there are no commentaries in Colorado discussing the extent or limita-
tions of the CCPA and practitioners cannot assess the viability of a cli-
ent's claim that might potentially fall under the CCPA.
Practitioners should however note that the CCPA has been liberally
construed when litigated and there are provisions that do not require
97. COLO. REv. STAT. § 6-1-105 (1)(f) (1987 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
98. Id § 6-1-105 (1)(g) (1987 & Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
99. 399 N.E.2d 567 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978).
100. Id. at 570.
101. Western Food Plan v. District Ct., 598 P.2d 1038, 1041 (Colo. 1979).
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scienter. Equally as important are the damage provisions that allow a
successful client to recover attorney fees, court costs and treble dam-
ages, and although a showing of scienter might be necessary, the dam-
age provisions make a successful claim under this Act much more
fruitful than under common law theories of fraud and misrepresenta-
tion. Colorado practitioners who know of the CCPA can reap benefits
for themselves and their clients by utilizing the CCPA instead of bring-
ing actions for fraud or misrepresentation. Once Colorado attorneys
begin to familiarize themselves with the CCPA and begin to use the Act
in place of traditional common law remedies, the reported case law and
secondary materials will generate more awareness which, in turn, will
cause increased usage. Indeed, the legislature might take a renewed in-
terest in amending the CCPA to more accurately fulfill its original pur-
poses. The domino effect would soon begin.
V. INCREASED USE: PANACEA OR PANDORA'S Box?
Undoubtedly, the TDTPA has, over the years, helped many victim-
ized consumers. Unfortunately, the liberal interpretation of the TDTPA
combined with yearly legislative expansions have caused concern that
the Texas Act no longer fulfills its objectives. This section explores
whether an increased usage of the CCPA would cause similar problems
in Colorado and whether a gradual, well-controlled increase in usage
could possibly elude such difficulties.
Even a few years after its passage, commentators recognized the po-
tential threat posed by a reckless expansion of the TDTPA's reach.
The DTPA remains a law of vast potential both for abuse and
for legitimately compensating the wronged consumer. It is a
grand experiment which requires a profound search for the
purpose of the Act. Each element of the prima facie case
should be examined against the need to protect the consumer
rather than influenced by a misguided desire to purify the ad-
vertiser's language at any expense to the merchant. Only by
carefully balancing the needs of the consumer with the burden
imposed on the merchant in the marketplace can the fairest and
most lasting solution be reached.
1 0 2
Despite this commentator's thoughtful admonitions, the TDTPA rapidly
expanded to unmanageable proportions. All provisions of the TDTPA
have been litigated with such frequency that the Texas judiciary and leg-
islature scarcely have opportunities to step back and objectively com-
mence a "profound search for the purpose of the Act." 108 If such a
"search" was performed and the needs of the consumers were carefully
balanced with the burdens placed on marketplace merchants, the Texas
legislature and judiciary would most likely conclude that the one time
"panacea" has now transformed into a Pandora's box.





When the Texas legislature originally enacted the TDTPA, it reas-
sured merchants that "no reputable, respectable, honest businessman
has anything to fear by the passage of this law."' 0 4 To the contrary, the
strict liability imposed by the TDTPA should cause any sensible business
person great concern-if not outright fear. 105 Whether a businessper-
son is "honest," "reputable" or "respectable" makes no difference
when a strict liability standard is used. It is apparent that the legisla-
ture's words of assurance were little more than empty promises.
Although the strict liability standard combined with liberal judicial inter-
pretation of the TDTPA convey substantial benefits to the consumer,
they also pose significant social costs.106 The TDTPA that originally
served to protect unsophisticated consumers from deceptive practices
now serves to "protect" multi-million dollar corporations against other
multi-million dollar corporations.1 0 7 Since the TDTPA now protects
large corporate entities from other corporate entities, the result is ex-
tremely large awards never anticipated by the original framers. Applica-
tion of the TDTPA to large commercial transactions makes little sense in
light of the Act's purpose. First, it can hardly be said that large corpora-
tions are "unsophisticated" or "inexperienced" in marketplace transac-
tions. Presumably, most large corporations have the wherewithal and
ability to seek legal advice before entering into large transactions. Some
commentators even argue that allowing large commercial transactions
to fall under the TDTPA effectively renders the UCC obsolete.' 08 In-
deed, why would a large corporation ever seek recourse for inferior or
non-conforming goods under the UCC when treble damages were avail-
able under the TDTPA?109 Furthermore, it would seem that the large
amounts involved in most commercial disputes by themselves create in-
centives to fully litigate a commercial claim without the added benefits
provided by the TDTPA.
Another reason for the passage of UDAP statutes is deterrence.
However, the statute is an ineffective deterrent when applied to com-
mercial disputes. In a corporate setting, the large awards available under
the TDTPA will inevitably increase the cost of doing business. 10 The
104. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc. v. Gammage, 644 S.W.2d 170, 176-77 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982).
105. See generally Harrison, supra note 6, at 12-15; Michelle R. Sherman, Texas DTPA:
Treble Trouble?, 37 BAYLOR L. REV 993 (1985); Robert A. Rowland, III & EvelynJo Wilson,
DTPA as Offensive Weapon for Businesses, 20 Hous. LAw. 28 (1982).
106. Peter 0. Steiner, The Legalization ofAmerican Society: Economic Regulation, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 1285, 1286 (1983).
107. Compare 1973 TEx. GEN. LAws 322, 323 (original statute confined definition of
"consumer" to individuals) with TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.45 (4) (West 1987)
(current definition of consumer includes partnerships, corporations and governmental
subdivisions). In fact, the only restriction on the term "consumer" is that the plaintiff
cannot have assets of more than $25 million. Id.
108. Robert E. Goodfriend & Michael P. Lynn, Of White Knights and Black Knights: An
Analysis of the 1979 Amendments to the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 33 S.w. LJ. 941, 1002-
03 n.355 (1979) (DTPA threatens to displace UCC due to higher recoveries).
109. Breach of warranty claims are litigated with much greater frequency under the
TDTPA because of the more appealing remedies. Id. at 1002 n.355.
110. Harrison, supra note 6, at 891.
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unsuccessful corporation ultimately passes on the cost increases from
TDTPA litigation to the consumer, while the successful corporation re-
tains the difference between the actual damages and the enhanced dam-
ages allowed under the TDTPA as windfall. In a market that is not
purely competitive, the unsuccessful corporate defendant has no incen-
tive to comply with the TDTPA since the individual consumer ultimately
pays any damage award. The lack of incentive to comply with the
TDTPA translates into a lack of deterrence. Thus, a major purpose of
the TDTPA is not met when commercial transactions are allowed to fall
under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear that Colorado and Texas are at opposite ends of the
UDAP spectrum. The TDTPA imposes strict liability while the CCPA
requires either scienter or objective intent. Neither statute truly fulfills
the underlying purposes of UDAP legislation-the TDTPA coming clos-
est of the two. If it is true that the underlying principle of UDAP legisla-
tion is to provide prompt, economical and readily available remedies
against fraud and misrepresentation, then Colorado must seriously con-
sider whether its current statute can ever truly accomplish that goal. By
analogy to the TDTPA, it would appear that a relaxation of the scienter
requirement in the CCPA would give consumers greater access to
prompt, economical and readily available remedies. However, even
under the current statute, there is still potential for consumer redress
and practitioners should be aware of the liberal damages available under
the statute. As practitioners begin to use this statute with greater fre-
quency, the contours and limitations of the Act will emerge. Moreover,
once practitioners begin to divert attention from traditional common
law remedies to the CCPA, consumers will truly begin to enjoy the pro-
tection granted by the Colorado General Assembly over twenty years
ago. At the present time, the CCPA is by no means a panacea to decep-
tive and unfair trade practices, but neither is it a Pandora's box. In the
course of CCPA litigation, Colorado courts should remain true to the
goal of the CCPA by carefully weighing the purposes of the CCPA and
the needs of the consumer with the potential for over-liberalization of
the CCPA. If the courts develop CCPA case precedent recognizing both
the need for consumer protection and the potential for abuse, Colorado
should be able to protect its consumers against deceptive trade practices











State Statute Itemization Actions Damages ages Fees
Ala. Code § 8-19-891 X X X
Alaska Stat. § 45.50.471 X X X
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 44-1521 X X
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 4-88-101 X X X
Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code § 17200 (West) X X X X X
Cal. Civ. Code § 1700 (West)
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 6-1-101 X X X X X
Con. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-110 (West) X X X
Del. Code Ann. tit. 6 § 25
D.C. Code Ann. tit. 28-3904 X X X X X
Fla. Stat. Ann § 501.201 (West) X X
Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-370 X X X X
Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 481A-1 X X
Idaho Code § 48-601 X X X X
Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 121.5 § 261 X X X X
Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-1 X X X X
Iowa Code Ann. § 714.16 X
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-623 X X X
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 367.110 X
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 51:1401 X
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 5, § 206 X
Md. [Com. Law] § 13-101 X X X
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 93A, § 1 X X
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 445.901 X X X
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 325D.42 (West) X X X
Miss. Code. Ann. § 75-24-1 X X X
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.010 X X X
Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. § 30-14-101 X X
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1601 X X
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 598.360 X
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 358-A:1 X X X X X
NJ. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1 (West) X X X X
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 57-12-1 X X X X
N.Y. [Gen. Bus.] Law § 349 (McKinney) X X X
N.C. Gen Stat. § 75-1 X X X X
N.D. Cent. Code § 51-15-01 X X
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1333 (Page) X X X
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 15 § 751 (West) X X X X
Or. Rev. Stat. § 646.605 X X X X
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 201-1 (Purdon) X X X X
R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-13.1-1 X X X X
S.C. Code § 39-5-10 X X X
S.D. Codified Laws § 37-24-I X X
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(1)
State Statute
Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-101
Tex. [B&C] Code Ann. § 17.41 (Vernon)








Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 2451a X X X
Va. Code § 59.1-196 X X X X
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 19.86.020 X X X
W.Va. Code § 46A-6-101 X X
Wisc. Stat. Ann. § 100.18 (West) X X X
Wyo. Stat. § 40-12-101 X X X
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